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UNITED STATES

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20549

December 11, 1997

OFFICE OF

THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT

William T. Allen, Chairman
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10012
Dear Chairman Allen:

The staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “staff”) is pleased to
respond to your request that we review the report presented to the Board on October 20
by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (the “AICPA”), entitled
Serving the Public Interest: A New Conceptual Frameworkfor Auditor Independence
(the “White Paper”) and provide our commentary to the Board. I understand that the
Board will be discussing the White Paper at its December 15 meeting. Those
observations are presented in the attached Appendix.

The White Paper articulates well an argument for a particular approach and a
particular model that would provide for greater professional self-regulation. The staff's
understanding and expectation, however, is that the Board intends to deliberate and
solicit input on the issues from many points of view. In the staff's view, the White Paper
does not present the balanced exposition of the issues that will be essential for the
Board’s deliberations and for soliciting public input. Consistent with that expectation,
the staff believes that the Board should consider developing a more neutral document that
presents the full range of issues and views before soliciting public input. The approach
used by the Financial Accounting Standards Board for preparing discussion memoranda
might be a useful model for the Board.
The staff s observations presented in the Appendix reflect the Commission’s
overarching concern for maintaining investor confidence in the independent audit and the
capital markets. The role of the independent audit in public capital markets is to enhance
the credibility of financial reports, thereby providing investors with a degree of comfort
that they will be treated fairly. While many factors arguably affect the efficient
functioning of capital markets, it seems obvious that those markets will not function
unless the information used for making investment decisions has credibility. Thus, the
independent audit’s significant role in providing credibility must be first and foremost on
the Board’s agenda.
As the Board takes up the issues that lie ahead, expectations demand that the
investor’s point of view be kept sharply in focus. As it considers the issues, the Board’s
important decisions must be guided by the answers to the most basic of questions —
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whether a reasonable investor, with full knowledge of all of the facts and circumstances,
would have confidence that the independent auditor would put the interests of investors
first and that those interests would not be compromised by any conflicting interest of the
auditor or the auditor’s client. Only affirmative answers to those kinds of questions will
assure the market credibility that is so essential.

The staff agrees that framing the discussion in the context of the changing
business and professional environment is useful. Clearly, the application of some
guidance that worked well decades ago is less clear today. Conversely, some more recent
and important issues are not addressed in the guidance at all. The Board will be expected
to fill those gaps.

Although investors’ expectations of the independent audit have been the focus of
the Commission’s rule-making from the beginning, it is clear that all could, and should,
learn more. The White Paper suggests that the Board may want to sponsor research in
certain areas. The staff believes that the Board will need wide-ranging research focused
on identifying and gaining a better understanding of the issues that affect investors’
confidence in financial reports.
The staff recognizes that thoughtful consideration of these important issues will
take time. The White Paper, as I mentioned earlier, proposes one approach and model,
presented from the point of view of the practicing profession. But there are other,
important considerations, and judging the issues will take objective analysis, deliberation,
and substantial public dialogue. The staff is committed to assisting you in those efforts.

From the Commission’s perspective, the goals of strengthening the quality and
independence of audits are clear and unambiguous — it’s all about maintaining investor
confidence in the fairness and honesty of our securities markets. That was the objective
of the securities laws that require an independent audit, and it is the fundamental focus of
the Commission today.

Thank you very much for providing this opportunity for the staff to share its
views with the Board.
Sincerely,

Michael H. Sutton
Chief Accountant
Appendix

SEC STAFF ANALYSIS

AICPA WHITE PAPER: A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
The staff of the SEC concurs with the overarching imperative stated in the White
Paper of serving the public interest in assuring auditor independence. This is consistent
with the view expressed by the Supreme Court that clarifies the auditor’s “ultimate
allegiance to a corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public”
and that the auditor’s “public watchdog” function “demands that the accountant maintain
total independence from the audit client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the
public trust.” United States v. Arthur Young, 465 US 805, 817 (1984). With that goal in
mind the following analysis is respectfully submitted.1

I.

THE WHITE PAPER ILLUSTRATES THAT MORE STUDY IN THIS
AREA IS NEEDED.

The principal conclusion reached by the White Paper is that the existing regulatory
system should be replaced with a principles-based model. The White Paper further states
that the new model would have the ISB establish core principles of independence,
establish safeguards, and challenge firms to design effective independence codes.
To understand whether, and if so how, the existing system may be improved, it is
important to consider how the present system evolved and operates. That consideration
necessarily involves understanding, among other things: 1) the procedures and guidance
that firms have in place to deal with independence issues that arise; and 2) how the firms
interact with the AICPA, the SEC, and other regulatory bodies. Most firms already have
guidance or “codes” of independence, and these documents could provide the ISB with an
excellent source of educational material in order to understand the issues.

It also would be helpful to further explore the notion of whether the existing
system is a “command and control” regulatory system or merely the natural evolution of
any system that would involve implementing principles of independence. It appears that
the AICPA, which is not a regulatory body, developed a very similar system to the SEC’s
with respect to addressing independence issues and experienced the same result. First, the
SEC developed, overtime, certain underlying guidelines or principles of independence.
(See Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X.) Those underlying guidelines state that the auditor
should not enter into relationships that a reasonable investor would perceive as placing the
auditor in the position of having either mutual or conflicting interests with the audit client.
Those relationships would include, among other things, situations in which the auditor

1 The comments that follow are those of the staff of the SEC and do not necessarily
represent the views of the Commission.
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would audit his or her own work, act in the capacity of management or an employee of the
audit client, act as an advocate or attorney or broker/dealer for the client, or have a
financial interest in the client.

Similarly, the AICPA developed broad guidelines based on the same notion that an
auditor must be independent in fact and appearance. Both the SEC and the AICPA
developed an extensive base of “interpretations” of their respective basic notions or
principles of independence that address fact-specific independence questions. In each
case, the broad notions and specific interpretations were developed over a long period of
time, with input from knowledgeable practitioners and regulators, and after consideration
of administrative and court cases. In this sense, instead of “command and control”
regulation, it has been a participatory “question and answer” form of regulation.

After substantial consideration of the White Paper, the staff believes that
significant additional research is needed before the ISB may decide which regulatory
approaches would best serve the public interest by promoting investors’ confidence in the
credibility of financial reporting and the markets.
It appears that in certain areas new, updated research is needed — focusing on
investors’ confidence in the audit process and in the markets — before the ISB considers
whether to abandon approaches that have been in place for 60 years. The current system,
although it may be in need of repair, has worked. For example, an article co-authored by
a CPA and a lawyer in the July 1993 edition of The CPA Journal noted that independence
issues have been somewhat mitigated because both the profession and the SEC
strengthened the rules over the years. Brown and Carmichael, “An Analysis of SEC
Disciplinary Proceedings,” The CPA Journal, 54 (July 1993). This system, therefore,
should not be dismissed lightly.
A research approach similar to that discussed on pages 46 through 48 of the White
Paper might be appropriate, provided it is focused on investors. This research, which
could assist the Board’s evaluation of various independence models, could cover a range
of issues such as:

Who are the investors the independence requirement is intended to protect? (in
view of the “resurgence” of small investors, it may be appropriate to define a
“reasonable investor” in terms of small investors having sufficient confidence in the
markets to continue investing directly or through mutual funds),
Are investors concerned about the current regulatory structure, and if so, why?
(the White Paper seems to suggest that investor confidence in the audit process is
high; this may imply that the current auditor independence regulatory system is
working; and, that investors may believe that the SEC will not permit an auditor
to engage in any activity that creates a mutuality of interest),

What should the conceptual underpinnings for auditor independence be?
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What nonaudit services are firms providing to SEC audit clients today, and are
investors aware of these services? Would disclosure of the services provided to
public companies be helpful in improving investor understanding?

What nonaudit services or business relationships, between auditors and their SEC
audit clients do investors consider important? (note that in the October 20, 1997
ISB meeting, the analyst group observed that, if they perceive an independence
problem, they simply “walk-away from the stock”),
What nonaudit services would the firms provide to SEC audit clients and what
business relationships would be entered into if the AICPA White Paper approach
were adopted? How would investors react to those services and relationships?

Does an investor’s perception of an independence problem change when a
significant financial reporting problem or financial fraud has gone undetected by
the auditor?

How would investors react to leaving it to each firm to determine its own
independence code, subject only to broad guidelines?
What are the countervailing pressures on individual auditors and firms between
providing investor confidence in the audit process and expanding nonaudit
services?
H.

THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE INVESTOR

It is of utmost importance to keep the mission of the ISB sharply in focus. Article
1, paragraph 1, of the ISB’s Operating Policies, states that the mission of the ISB is “to
establish independence standards applicable to audits of public entities in order to serve
the public interest and to protect and promote investors’ confidence in the securities
markets.” The point of view of the investor and the investor’s view of the process,
therefore, are key elements in addressing auditor independence issues.
The SEC historically has maintained that the requirement for an independent audit
is to assure investor confidence in the audit process and in the markets; accordingly, it has
stressed the need to view independence issues from the investors’, not the auditors’, point
of view (auditing standards, the US Supreme Court, and others agree with this view by
stressing the need for auditors not only to be independent but also to appear to be
independent; see Part IV of the staff outline distributed at the October 20, 1997 ISB
meeting, which quotes portions of United States v. Arthur Young, 465 US 805, 819 n. 15
(1984) for the proposition that auditors must not only be independent but also be
perceived as independent).

The White Paper does not fully explore the recommended change in the system
from the investors’ point of view. Rather, the White Paper appears to be written from the
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point of view that if the auditor believes he or she is acting with integrity and objectivity in
performing an audit, then whether a relationship, service, or event impairs independence
should focus on a “balancing of risks and benefits in the public interest.” The Paper
indicates that the auditor’s view of the independence issue is significant because
“participants in the regulated profession possess detailed knowledge not available to the
regulators and standards-setters.” (page 6) The White Paper further reflects this point of
view by defining “independence” as “an absence of interests that create an unacceptable
risk of bias with respect to the quality or context of information that is the subject of an
audit engagement.” (pages 7 and 14) The Paper also emphasizes that, as a general rule,
firms should be able to perform almost any service provided “safe-guards” are in place to
protect the public, (pages 128-130 and elsewhere).

The White Paper similarly stresses the auditors’ views as opposed to investors’
views when it emphasizes that the firms are “best positioned to recognize the risks and
threats [to auditor independence], and ... also possess the incentives to achieve an
appropriate solution.” (page 8) The White Paper also notes that firms should exercise
“front-line responsibility” for interpreting independence requirements, (page 15).
None would deny that auditor involvement in the independence process is
essential; however, when considering new auditor independence codes, the firms would
seem to be subject to conflicting interests. As a result, a public body, rather than the
firms, would seem to be in a better position to focus full attention on the most
fundamental issue — investor confidence in the independent audit — and to craft
appropriate solutions to significant independence issues.
In addition, advocates of the White Paper approach emphasize that a firm would
be motivated by ISB review of the codes and market forces for audit services to have an
independence code that “enhances the independence of the firm and the audit partner.”
(page 8) A thorough analysis of the market incentives, however, should include
consideration of whether clients and potential clients would be attracted to firms with high
independence standards that may restrict the amount or type of services the firm may
provide to the client, or to a firm that emphasizes “economy of scales” in providing a
variety services over independence.

III.

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE WHITE PAPER

A.

Need for Interpretative Guidance

The White Paper criticizes current practice as a “command and control” system
because it is detailed and cumbersome. It is true that the current body of SEC and AICPA
guidance regarding independence consists primarily of “case law” in the form of ad hoc
interpretive guidance issued over the years. As noted earlier; however, there is the
possibility that the proposal in the White Paper for a short list of auditor independence
principles, and the issuance of general guidelines for firm codes, could follow the same
path and might result in an even more extensive, and more complex, body of interpretive
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guidance than exists today. This result could occur because the ISB’s interpretations
would have to address multiple firm codes as well as the SEC’s and AICPA’s regulations.

It has been the staff’s experience that firms often want assurance of their
independence before they enter into engagements or conduct audits that could expose
their SEC audit clients to either a delay in having a registration statement become effective
or the risk of a reaudit because of a question arising on an independence issue. It is not
clear how the proposal in the White Paper would eliminate that need for interpretive
advice.

The proposal in the White Paper would result in a system in which approximately a
thousand firms would adopt independence codes (although the Paper expresses a hope
that many of these will be duplicates, it also indicates that each firm will be encouraged to
adjust the ISB’s model codes to the firm’s particular circumstances, resulting in hundreds
of codes with both dramatic and subtle, but important, differences). Interpretive responses
would have to focus on both the common language and the differences in the firms’ codes.
Further, it has been suggested that if firms do not participate in the program outlined in
that Paper, those firms (domestic and foreign) will remain subject to the current regulatory
requirements. The current body of SEC interpretations, therefore, would have to remain
in tact.
With the ISB staff being asked to interpret both a variety of firm codes and the
existing SEC regulations, it will be extremely difficult for the ISB staff to maintain a set of
interpretive guidance that is logically consistent and useful to practitioners. In short, the
proposal in the White Paper very well could lead us back to the current situation with a set
of detailed, fact-specific interpretations.
B.

Need to remain focused on investor confidence

The White Paper presents a variety of issues and arguments that could lead the
reader away from the central goal of constructing auditor independence guidance that
assures investor confidence in the independent audit and in the securities markets. These
issues and arguments are discussed below.

Technical Skills. The White Paper stresses that a broad range of technical skills within
the firms improves the quality of audits. The issue, however, is not whether the firms
should have a variety of technical skills and disciplines; it is generally understood that they
should. The question is whether the firm that provides a particular nonaudit service to a
public company should be the same firm that audits the company’s financial statements.
To answer this question, the staff currently considers whether providing the particular
nonaudit service to an SEC audit client would, or would appear to a reasonable investor
to, (1) involve the auditor too directly in the management of that client or as an employee
of that client, (2) align the financial and business interests of the auditor too closely with
those of management, or (3) result in the auditor auditing his/her own work.
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Firm's Economic Interests. The in-depth discussion in the White Paper of the economic
interest of firms in their reputation (“reputational capital”) and a firm’s economy of scale
in providing several services to one client (the “quasi-rents” and “productive capital”
discussions on page 60 and elsewhere) overstates significantly the relevance of these
issues to an investor’s analysis of auditor independence.
In this regard, the White Paper indicates that a new approach to addressing
independence issues is necessary because “the current approach fails to serve the public
interest because it is inefficient, inflexible and imposes social costs without compensating
benefits.” (page 10) The White Paper also argues that incidents that would impair
independence in a single client context (e.g., that the auditor cannot obtain a return on its
“productive capital” invested in a client without retaining that client (pages 60 and 61) or
that the auditor receives a significant portion of its revenues from one client (page 65))
should not impair the independence of firms with multiple clients. The Paper indicates that
the need for the firm to protect its aggregate revenues is not tied to one client but to all of
its clients and, therefore, regardless of how much the firm has invested in one client or
how much revenue it receives from one client, the firm would rather walk away from that
client than damage its reputation and risk a loss of many clients.
In considering an auditor independence issue, however, the primary focus should
be on whether the conduct is reasonable in the eyes of investors, rather than the cost
benefit analysis done by a firm to see if providing a service to an SEC audit client is worth
the cost or whether there is any potential harm to the firm’s reputation. There is a
profound social benefit, which is not developed in the White Paper, in having investors
maintain confidence in the audit process and in the integrity of the securities markets. This
benefit cannot be quantified, but it is real nonetheless.
The ISB also should consider the other side of the economy of scale issue, that is,
the practice of some firms to underprice audit fees in competing for the audit engagement
with an expectation that other, more profitable, nonaudit services and business
relationships would follow. These practices have raised concerns for both the quality and
independence of audits.

A related issue which the ISB may consider is the impact of conflicting or mutual
interests on the audit partner’s (as opposed to the firm’s) decisions regarding the audit.
The audit partner’s reputation and career may be impacted if one significant client is lost.
Audit Quality. The White Paper advocates the expansion of nonaudit services as a means
to enhance audit quality. Audit quality, however, is not the issue; everyone supports high
quality audits. It should be the auditors’ obligation to serve the public and their duty to
act with professional skepticism that assures a quality audit rather than a multi-service
relationship with the client.

Arguments that more knowledge of the client increases the quality of the audit
(page 68 and elsewhere), taken to the extreme, would have the auditor keeping the books
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and preparing the financial statements. Once a firm has worked closely with a client to
improve the client’s operations or reporting systems, it would appear that the firm would
have difficulty in providing a “critical second look” at those operations and systems. Also,
there is little evidence that the individuals performing nonaudit services (such as computer
engineers) recognize information significant to the audit.
Arguments in the White Paper that having a firm other than the auditor provide
nonaudit services impairs the auditor’s access to client information (page 73 n. 187 and
elsewhere) are disturbing. If the auditor does not receive all the information necessary to
conduct a thorough audit and full cooperation from the client, the Commission expects the
auditor to indicate that there is a “scope limitation” on the audit and appropriately qualify
the audit report. Thus, it is the independent auditor’s obligation to conduct a professional
audit that assures the integrity of the financial markets, not an array of services provided
to the client. See United States v. Arthur Young, supra, at 818-819.
Two common concerns regarding the effect of nonaudit services on audit quality
are (1) whether the emphasis on nonaudit services - because of their profitability - could
cause a firm to assign a lower priority to audit services, and (2) whether, or at what point,
the increasing complexities of the professional and business environment could threaten
the fact and appearance of auditor independence. These concerns should be the focus of
the ISB’s research and deliberations.

Free Riding. The White Paper suggests that auditor independence concerns may be
limited to a few individual partners who may be tempted to “free ride” on the firm’s
reputation by pursuing their self interests, (page 67) In the staff's view, however, the issue
is not restricted to the possibility that a few individuals may be “free riding” on the
reputation of an accounting firm. In truth, there is no reliable information indicating how
many auditors may be disregarding potential auditor independence conflicts when
obtaining business or assisting clients. This may be one area where additional research
would be helpful.

For example, a study published in the Journal of Business Ethics and reported in
The Wall Street Journal indicated that 47% of the top executives, 41% of the controllers,
and 76% of the graduate-level business students participating in an experiment would be
willing to commit fraud by understating write-offs that cut into their company’s profits.
The Wall Street Journal, at C1 (March 26, 1996); Brief, Dukerich, Brown, Brett, “What’s
Wrong with the Treadway Commission Report? Experimental Analyses of the Effects of
Personal Values and Codes of Conduct on Fraudulent Financial Reporting,” 15 Journal of
Business Ethics 183 (1996).
The issue, however, is not necessarily limited to “rogue auditors,” it is how to
provide comprehensive and understandable guidance to auditors while giving comfort to
the public that the independent audit function remains protective of the interest of
investors.
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Legal Liability - Litigation Risks. Contrary to the arguments in the White Paper (page
82 and elsewhere), potential legal liability in a civil proceeding is not a deterrent to
compromising independence. No firm, to the best knowledge of the staff, has paid a
judgment or settlement in a private civil proceeding solely as a result a finding of a loss of
auditor independence. The arguments and statistics in the White Paper addressing legal
liability and litigation costs simply are not relevant to this issue.
The absence of case law addressing auditor independence issues may be attributed
to, among other things, (1) the absence of public knowledge of the nature and extent of
nonaudit services provided by the firms to audit clients and (2) the fact that a lack of
auditor independence may not, by itself, be considered to have caused a plaintiff's
damages. See e.g., Robbins v. Koger Properties. Inc., Deloitte & Touche, et al., 116 F.3d
1441 (11th Cir. 1997). A lack of independence, however, may be used as evidence of the
accounting firm’s intent to participate in a fraudulent scheme. See Lerch v. Citizens First
Bancorp, et al., [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ (DNJ
1992).
Although private litigation has been limited, the Commission has initiated several
enforcement cases in this area. These cases show that a lack of auditor independence can,
and does, impact the quality of the audit of a client’s financial statements. For example, in
some cases, the auditor performed virtually no audit procedures and simply relied on
management’s representations. Many recent enforcement cases are listed in the outline
distributed by the staff at the October 20 ISB meeting.

Other Self-Regulatory Examples. The regulatory frameworks used by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, bank regulators,
the SEC in regulating investment companies and investment advisers, and other regulatory
frameworks cited in the White Paper (pages 106-114 and elsewhere), are inapposite to the
regulation of auditor independence. Each of the cited regulatory compliance programs
relates to heavily regulated industries that include on-site inspections or examinations by
government employees to assure the program is being carried out.

The Commission’s oversight of the establishment of accounting and auditing
standards and expected oversight of the establishment of independence standards by the
ISB does not subject the auditing profession to the same degree of government regulation
as banks, nuclear power plants, investment companies, investment advisers, or compliance
with OSHA and similar regulations. Also, peer review in the auditing profession, although
beneficial to the profession and the public, does not equate to the public assurance
provided by direct government inspections and examinations.
Also, during the formation of the ISB, the Commission stressed that the auditor
independence regulatory program should not be left solely to the auditing profession. The
Commission did not endorse the then-existing professional independence body (the
AICPA’s Ethics Division) as the authoritative source for independence guidance. Instead,
the Commission insisted on a new body with public representation, an open and public
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standard setting process with public commentary on draft standards, and Commission
oversight. A strictly “self-regulatory” approach would not be in line with the principles on
which the ISB was founded.

Abandoning the Current System. The current regulatory system is criticized at several
points in the White Paper as being a “command and control” approach, overly rigid,
detached from “ethical moorings,” and so on. (pages 10, 96-102 and elsewhere). While
the staff expects the ISB to review and improve that system, it should be done only after
full consideration of all reasonable alternatives, including the alternative of simply updating
and clarifying that system.

The White Paper states that a lack of auditor independence to date has not been
either a substantial factor in audit failures or a serious concern to investors. For example,
it cites the study regarding the absence of insurance claims in this area (but see the
discussion above regarding Legal Liability - Litigation Risks that indicates such claims
may not be a true indication of independence concerns), (page 56) This acknowledgment
may be a strong endorsement that the current system, consisting of the publication of
detailed examples and interpretations, is working to protect investors’ confidence in the
markets.
Many of the arguments in the White Paper for a new regulatory approach focus on
the fact that the current regulatory system presents difficulties when firms seek to provide
many services to one client. (See the Firm’s Economic Interests paragraph above.) The
auditor independence regulatory system, however, must not lose sight of the primary
purpose for having audited financial statements — enhancing investor confidence in the
markets — in favor of facilitating the growth of firms’ nonaudit services.
Finally, the proposal that the IIC establish best practices or “benchmarks” for
auditor independence codes (page 124 and elsewhere) is reminiscent of the IASC’s efforts
to establish benchmark international accounting standards. These efforts generally were
not effective and permitted a wide diversity in accounting practice. The ISB should
consider whether a similar result could occur here.

C.

Materiality

The White Paper states that “the guidelines [for firm auditor independence codes]
would recognize the importance of materiality as a threshold consideration in applying the
core principles.” (page 8) This point is restated later in the Paper as a presumption,
“Immaterial interactions between an auditor or firm and an audit client should be
presumed not to impair auditor independence, absent evidence to the contrary.” (page
118; emphasis in original) The White Paper also stresses that materiality has both
quantitative and qualitative aspects (page 127 n. 333), and that materiality may be
assessed on an individual audit partner or audit team level as well as at the firm level,
(page 127)
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As noted in the White Paper, the staff has been reluctant to use a firm-level
quantitative materiality standard for evaluating independence issues because (1) due to the
size of the major firms, no individual client or contract might be material, (2) for smaller
firms, a materiality standard may become an absolute bar to entry into a service line or
business, and (3) the statutory standard is that auditors must be independent and, with
limited exceptions, a firm either is independent or it is not. In this regard, the current
regulations recognize that even an immaterial independence violation may raise concerns
for investors, such as when the auditor has a mutual interest with the audit client in the
client’s financial or operating success, when one individual may be able to influence both
the company and the auditor, or when the auditor would be confronted with conflicting
interests (his/her duty to investors versus the interests of his/her family, former associates,
and so on).
The staff also has emphasized that, when evaluating whether a matter is an
immaterial business relationship under the current independence regulations, the matter
must be immaterial not only to the auditing firm but also to the audit client and other
affiliated organizations. See letter dated June 20, 1990, from Edmund Coulson, Chief
Accountant, to Mr. Robert Mednick.
For these reasons, the staff believes that, as mentioned in the White Paper, any
discussion of materiality should include both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of
materiality and to whom the materiality standard will be applied (firm, audit partner, audit
team, client, affiliates of the firm or audit client, and so on).

D.

Profession-Wide Culture

The White Paper states that each firm may adopt an independence code that
“reflects its culture, organizational structure, compensation system, practice priorities,
quality controls and personnel policies.” (page 8) This statement may be in response to the
admonition in the Kirk Panel Report that firms should find a way to enhance the unique
and overriding importance of the audit function in their multi-service firms. On the other
hand, this statement and others in the Paper may suggest that auditors are eroding a
profession-wide culture that historically set them apart from other service providers.
E.

Legislative Intent

The White Paper suggests that the current regulatory scheme “may be seen as at
odds with Congress’ original intent” because the current regulations stress maintaining
investor confidence in the markets by requiring auditors to be independent in fact and
appearance, and provides detailed guidance to auditors on specific, fact-based
independence issues, (page 11) The White Paper also takes comfort from the fact that
Congress “expressed no concern about audit firms providing non-audit services to audit
clients or the appearance of independence.” (page 11).
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In truth, there is little legislative history regarding the auditor independence
requirements in the securities laws. The principal source of such history consists of
testimony at congressional hearings in 1933. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 875 Before the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., at 60 (1933). There is
no indication that Congress in 1933 was informed about, or considered, the issue of the
provision of nonaudit services to audit clients. The independence requirement, however,
clearly was part of the statutory scheme enacted to promote investor confidence in the
securities markets.

The role for auditors envisioned by Congress in 1933 might be reflected best in the
original language in section 11(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”). This
section, as originally adopted, stated that in certifying registrants’ financial statements, the
“degree of reasonableness” required of auditors in performing audits “shall be that
required of a person occupying a fiduciary relationship.” See also H R. Rep. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1933), which states that “the essential characteristic [of the civil
liabilities imposed by the 1933 Act] consists of a requirement that all those responsible for
statements upon the face of which the public is solicited to invest its money shall be held
to standards like those imposed by law upon a fiduciary.” In 1934, this language was
amended to “remove possible uncertainties as to the standard of reasonableness by
substituting for the present language the accepted common law definition of the duty of a
fiduciary.” H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1934). This concept of the
auditor having a fiduciary relationship with purchasers and sellers of securities has
continued and is reflected in the Arthur Young case noted above, in which the US
Supreme Court stressed the auditor’s “ultimate allegiance to a corporation’s creditors and
stockholders, as well as to the investing public” and the “public watchdog” function that
“demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times and
requires complete fidelity to the public trust.” 465 US at 817-818. As noted elsewhere in
this letter, this case also emphasized the requirement that auditors be independent in fact
and appearance.
Based on the legislative history and the Court’s interpretation of the securities
laws, it seems clear that those laws were intended to revive investor confidence in the
securities markets, and that instilling auditors with a fiduciary obligation to serve investors
and to remain independent from audit clients was part of that effort. The staff, therefore,
continues to believe that having auditors maintain the appearance, as well as the fact, of
independence, and that providing guidance to auditors on independence issues on request
(and making those interpretations available to the public), are consistent with the intent of
Congress in enacting the federal securities laws.

F.

Disclosure of Nonaudit Services

The White Paper discusses the Commission’s prior disclosure requirement
regarding the provision of nonaudit services to SEC audit clients and the relative fees for
those nonaudit services. (pages 51 through 55) The Paper suggests that the withdrawal
of that disclosure requirement over 15 years ago indicates that a new, less intrusive
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requirement for the disclosure of nonaudit services provided by the auditor of a
registrant’s financial statements (excluding fee disclosures) would not be usefill to
investors.
For a discussion of the prior disclosure requirement and why it was rescinded,
please see pages 27 through 34 of the Staff Report on Auditor Independence, published by
the Office of the Chief Accountant in March 1994. In sum, one of the principal reasons
for withdrawing that disclosure requirement was that boards of directors and
managements were considering whether to engage their auditors to perform nonaudit
services based on the disclosure of the fees associated with particular services, rather than
on the nature of the service and its effect on an auditor’s independence. As noted in the
White Paper, most of the comments supporting recession were received from public
companies (not investors).

It may be that the ISB should initiate discussion of whether public disclosure of
nonaudit services provided to registrants by the auditors of their financial statements
should be reinstated. Most sources agree that the nature and extent of nonaudit services
have evolved significantly over the last 15 years; however, there is little publicity or public
knowledge of the services that currently are being performed. As was stressed in the
October 20 ISB meeting, it is important for the ISB to have current research based on the
current audit environment. Perhaps the best way to facilitate that research, and the best
way to educate investors, is for the Commission to reinstate a disclosure requirement.
G.

Joint Business Ventures

The White Paper suggests that the ISB develop a “pragmatic approach that allows
... business relationships with audit clients - provided adequate safeguards exist to protect
auditor independence” (page 3; see also page 94).
In 1988, major accounting firms filed a rulemaking petition with the Commission
suggesting that direct business relationships, including prime/subcontractor relationships,
would be deemed to impair an auditor’s independence only if the relationship was material
to either the auditor or the audit client. The Commission response to the petition (at page
4 of the letter dated February 14, 1989 from Jonathan G. Katz to Duane R. Kullberg)
states, in part:

“The Commission has recognized that certain situations, including those in
which accountants and their audit clients have joined together in a profit-seeking
venture, create a unity of interest between the accountant and the client. In such
cases, both the revenue accruing to each party in the prime/subcontractor
relationship and the existence of the relationship itself create a situation in which to
some degree the auditor’s interest is wedded to that of its client. That
interdependence impairs the auditor’s independence, irrespective of whether the
audit was in fact performed in an objective, critical fashion. Where such a unity of
interests exists, there is an appearance that the auditor has lost the objectivity and
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skepticism necessary to take a critical second look at management’s
representations in the financial statements. The consequence is a loss of
confidence in the integrity of the financial statements.”

Despite the Commission’s clear rejection of the petition, the Commission invited
the petitioners to consult with the staff regarding whether “appropriate procedural
safeguards and limiting principles” could be developed that would allow auditing firms to
enter into certain direct business relationships without impairing their independence.
Before meaningful consultations could occur, however, a second petition was filed, which
also was not adopted by the Commission.

Prior Commission action on this issue indicates, once again, that significant
research may be appropriate before the ISB considers changing the existing regulations.
The staff will make the public information regarding these petitions available to the ISB on
request.
H.

Registrants' Responsibilities

The White Paper states that “the responsibility for maintaining independence rests
with individual auditors, their firms, and the accounting profession as a whole.” (page 15).
No one would deny that the profession plays a major role in this area. It has to be
recognized, however, that the responsibility under the federal securities laws is on the
issuer to obtain an independent audit of its financial statements. If the auditor is not
independent, the issuer pays the price of having filed unaudited financial statements and
deficient registration statements and reports with the Commission. In addition,
management has a serious role to play in the independence arena by deciding which
provider will furnish nonaudit services to the issuer. One issue the ISB may wish to
address is how to promote the involvement of managements, boards of directors, audit
committees, and others, in the development of independence practices and standards.

L

The Appearance of Auditor Independence

There was virtual agreement among the commentators and presenters at the
October 20 ISB meeting that the appearance of an auditor’s independence is just as critical
to investor confidence in the audit process and the markets as whether the auditor is
independent in fact. This position is supported and explained in the outline the staff
distributed at that meeting and at various points in this analysis.
Also, many of the arguments in the White Paper questioning the need for auditors
to maintain the appearance of auditor independence are not new. See the Office of the
Chief Accountant’s 1994 Staff Report on Auditor Independence for a discussion of the
history of this and related issues.
The suggestion in the White Paper that the ISB should address “appearance
issues” only when there is “an adequate empirical foundation, and a clear need, for such
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measures” (page 131) may miss the point. As noted at the outset of this analysis, the staff
encourages research regarding what services, relationships, and so on, might impact
investors’ confidence in the audit process and in the markets, and the use of that research
by the ISB in revising or creating new auditor independence criteria. If, however, an
“empirical foundation” requires a history of enforcement or other actions demonstrating
the presence of an independence problem as opposed to a reasoned analysis by the ISB,
then the damage to investor confidence in the process may occur before the empirical
evidence appears. The ISB, after considering the available relevant information, should
use its judgment regarding when an act or practice impairs the appearance of auditor
independence.
In sum, the staff believes that the goal of the requirement of auditor independence
is to foster investor confidence in the securities markets. That sense of investor trust and
confidence will endure only so long as auditors not only are in fact independent, but also
are perceived to be independent.

J.

Competition

The White Paper seems to approach the issues from a “big firm” point of view.
For example, it discusses independence issues in terms of “multi-disciplinary” firms with
“quasi-rents” and reputational and operational capital investments in clients. The paper
emphasizes that “multi-disciplinary firms offer access to an existing client base for multiple
services” (page 81) and the Paper seeks to facilitate exploitation of a firm’s audit client
base for the sale of nonaudit services.
The exploitation of an existing base of audit clients to sell nonaudit services and
promote additional business ventures could raise questions regarding whether auditors
have an unfair competitive advantage in bidding on and providing those services and
relationships. Indeed, smaller competent firms (both auditing and consulting firms) may
feel they are at a decided disadvantage.

Would the auditor’s bidding and “quasi-rents” cost advantage, for example,
promote or, in the long run, harm competition for and quality of nonaudit services?
Would encouraging fair competition among competent bidders of all sizes and professions
provide more innovation in services and a better, broader-based, and stronger economy?
For example, it is fairly well recognized that much of the economic growth in this country
and many new jobs come from small businesses. The answers to these questions are
beyond the scope of this analysis, and may be beyond the scope of the ISB’s
considerations. They are, however, indicative of the issues that the Commission may
consider should it engage in rulemaking to conform its rules to the ISB’s standards. See,
e g., section 23(a) of the Exchange Act, section 10b of the National Securities
Improvements Act, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
In this context, the staff has similar concerns about the application of a materiality
standard to auditor independence issues. What may be an insignificant contract to a large
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firm may be a significant source of revenue to a small one. It could be argues that a
materiality standard could foreclose the possibility of a small firm bidding on a contract,
reduce the competition faced by large firms from young energetic firms, and solidify the
big firms’ dominance as multi-service organizations.
If the ISB determines that the independence analysis changes based on the
materiality of a contract to the auditor, it should be careful not to inadvertently construct
barriers to small firms entering into various service lines.

K.

Enforceability of the White Paper Approach

There has been an implication that the Commission could enforce the approach in
the White Paper by bringing actions against (1) a firm or individuals in a firm (domestic or
foreign) that does not have an ISB approved code if the firm or individuals fail to comply
with existing SEC independence regulations, or (2) a firm or individuals in a firm that has
an approved ISB code if the firm or individuals fail to comply with that code. Although
the staff has not fully considered the matter, there may be inherent enforcement problems
including, among others, that differing codes among the firms potentially could yield
substantial inconsistency in determining acceptable or unacceptable conduct.
L.

Fire Walls

The White Paper suggests that Fire Walls (“Chinese Walls”), or walling off the
audit team from those individuals providing consulting services to the client, may preserve
auditor independence, (page 130) Such walls, however, would be contrary to the
suggestion in the White Paper that the use of consultants may improve the knowledge
base of the auditor and increase the efficiency of the audit. This dichotomy should be
addressed.

M.

Dependency

The White Paper appropriately states that auditors should not be financially
dependent upon an audit client, (page 132) Also important, however, is the expectation
that the client should not be dependent on the auditor from a financial or management
services standpoint.

Some have argued that a client’s dependency on the firm would not affect the
firm’s judgments regarding the audit of that client’s financial statements. Whether this is
correct or not, investors would seem to have little confidence that an audit conducted by
the firm that is sustaining (financially or otherwise) the operations of the client, would
constitute a critical second look at the company’s financial statements. Also, if the client
is dependent on the auditor, an investor rightly may ask whether he/she is investing in the
client based on the capabilities and resources of the client or those of the auditing firm.

16

N.

Managerial Functions

One of the basic notions of auditor independence has been that auditors should not
assume management decision making responsibilities. Deciding what are management
responsibilities, as opposed to the auditor’s responsibilities, however, can be very difficult
in practice.

The White Paper indicates that there should not be an independence issue if an
auditor provides services to a client “so long as management reviews, understands and
bears responsibility for adopting or rejecting the results of those services.” (page 137)
The staff, however, historically has maintained that (1) having client management approve
decisions made by the auditor does not negate the fact that the auditor has assumed a
management function, and (2) this approach ignores investors’ concerns about auditors
looking objectively at decisions they have either made or recommended to management.

Accordingly, the staff believes that research, as described above, should be
conducted before any final decisions are made regarding the impact of the auditor’s
participation in managerial functions on the auditor’s independence.

IV.

A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION OF OTHER ALTERNATIVES

One of the limitations of the White Paper is that it does not explore other more
comprehensive issues that might flow from its analysis. For instance, the White Paper
suggests that accounting firms increasingly should become advisors or partners with public
companies. With auditors and clients working so closely together, does this suggest that
auditors, rather than management, should prepare the financial statements? If the public
interest focus of the profession shifts from assuring investor confidence in the markets to
providing a variety of services to public company audit clients, does that suggest that the
Commission should consider other approaches for achieving its statutory mission?

V.

CONCLUSION

Although many of the statements and arguments in the White Paper are
troublesome, the staff's review and analysis does not suggest that approaching the issues
through a concise set of auditor independence principles, coupled with more precise
“guidelines” and encouragement for each firm to have an auditor independence code, is
inappropriate. In the staff's opinion, however, significant additional, timely research is
needed before the ISB can consider whether that approach, or one of many other
alternative approaches, may form the basis for independence standards that will promote
investor confidence in the independent audit and in the capital markets.

Enclosure:
SEC Office of the Chief Accountant, Staff Report on Auditor Independence
(March 1994).

